The Venezuela Dossier · Chapter I
Where exposure actually comes from, an unreliable public record, and the August oil agreement, and a general license map that is a genuine moving target.
Chapter I
The US Treasury has issued general and sector-specific licences carving out exceptions so companies can resume or extend operations in country. Certain operations still generate sanctions exposure — for US and non-US companies alike.
Sanctions compliance is probably one of the most complex elements to analyze in the current environment in Venezuela. The US Treasury Department has issued general and sector-specific licenses, carving out exceptions to allow companies to resume or extend operations in country. However, certain operations can still generate sanctions exposure for US and non-US companies, particularly if they:
The 50 percent rule
The US Treasury’s 50 percent rule allows only US entities, organized under US law before January 29, 2025, to engage in transactions with PDVSA and any entity where PDVSA holds a 50 percent or greater ownership stake. The rule facilitates operations such as new investments in oil ventures, formation of joint ventures and trading of oil and petroleum products originating in Venezuela.
Thorough and expert-led due diligence is essential now more than ever to not run afoul of these risks, and the anchor of any research is the reliability of the information upon which it's built. After the arrival of the Hugo Chavez regime in 1998, however, court and corporate ownership records, and the national registry of contracting entities, among other public records, often ceased to be reliable information sources through a combination of negligence and purposeful obfuscation.
Efforts by the Venezuelan judiciary began in 1997 to digitize all court decisions and centralized searching functions started off with much fanfare, aided by a World Bank modernization project. However, in or around 2004, the judiciary under the Chavez regime abandoned the effort and judicial information became increasingly incomplete and unreliable. The national registry of contracting entities, a database of entities authorized to contract with the government, also became a deliberate casualty of the regime’s negligence.
1997
Judiciary starts digitizing decisions with World Bank support and centralized search.
2004
The effort is abandoned; judicial information becomes incomplete and unreliable.
$40bn+
Estimates range to more than $300bn; some outlets place the high end at $900bn.
Estimates of the amount lost to corruption and/or graft in Venezuela in the period between 1998 and 2018 range widely between $40 billion to more than $300 billion. Of note, certain media outlets and nongovernmental organizations raise the high end of those estimates to three times that amount or $900 billion. Rampant corruption and cronyism produced hundreds of overnight millionaires and billionaires that needed to launder funds to access international banking systems. To do so with such gargantuan amounts, the profiteers desperately needed partners, advisors and investment opportunities to legitimize their ill-gotten gains.
The large amounts looted provided access to sophisticated enablers in the form of white shoe law firms, wealth advisors, tax planners and financial engineers all over the world who often turned a blind eye to the origin of the funds being handed to them in exchange for generous fees and commissions.Why the counterparty looks clean
So, with this ecosystem, anyone looking to invest in Venezuela or partner with a Venezuelan entity or individual that might have had a connection with the country must conduct a serious sanctions analysis to look for reliable information regarding:
With that template as a compass and with the knowledge that the information out of Venezuela to abide by those requirements is most likely incomplete, inaccurate, outdated and otherwise unreliable, human intelligence and advisors with subject matter expertise (preferably fully fluent in all things “Venezuela”) are an indispensable part of a robust due diligence and compliance review.
The general licence map
On top of that, the OFAC general license (“GL”) framework for Venezuela has moved extremely fast and grown more consequential since Maduro’s removal. Its provisions have been enacted reactively to address specific needs, which creates another layer of complexity, making it a genuinely moving target. OFAC issued and amended several general licenses in early 2026, then issued a further coordinated wave of amended licenses on June 10, 2026 (easing certain governing-law and dispute-resolution conditions).
In August 2026 the U.S. Government announced the U.S.–Venezuela oil agreement and OFAC issued another coordinated wave of licenses on August 21 and August 27, 2026 (extending into new sectors, including telecommunications, and updating the core oil, gas, mineral and PDVSA licenses), and, most recently, a further revision to the PDVSA-specific license — GL 52C — on September 14, 2026, in the immediate aftermath of the oil agreement's announcement. In practice, a license version cited in a memo or diligence file even a few weeks old may already have been superseded; every transaction should be checked against the current, dated version of the applicable GL before it is deemed reliable.
On August 28, 2026, President Trump announced what the White House fact sheet described as “the biggest oil deal in world history,” claiming US majority control of more than 65 billion barrels of proven Venezuelan oil reserves. The White House released additional details on September 1, 2026. Key terms disclosed in the fact sheet and subsequent reporting include:
For compliance purposes, the NABEP structure introduces a category of counterparty risk distinct from the earlier “closed list” licenses. NABEP is not one of the named companies authorized under GL 50 and its successors. Its authority to operate flows instead from the concessions granted under Venezuela's domestic hydrocarbons law and from the specific US government agreement described in the fact sheet, layered against the general and specific OFAC licenses in effect at the time of any given transaction.
Parties contracting with, subcontracting to, or financing NABEP — or seeking to participate in the anticipated $100 billion buildout — should treat this as its own diligence workstream: verifying which license (if any) covers the specific activity, confirming NABEP's and its affiliates' sanctions status, and monitoring how OFAC's Venezuela GLs are updated to reflect the agreement, since none of the licenses currently name NABEP the way GL 50 names Chevron, BP, Eni, Repsol, Shell and Maurel & Prom.
Authorizes “established US entities” (organized under US law on or before January 29, 2025) to export Venezuelan-origin oil and import petrochemical products into the US. Most recently reissued as GL 46D on August 27, 2026. GL 46E requires reporting only for non-US exports. It treats commercially reasonable swaps of crude, diluents or refined products as authorized. These are different from the barred debt swaps and payments in gold.
Authorizes the export of US-origin diluents (needed to dilute Venezuela's extra-heavy crude for transport/processing) to Venezuela. Most recently reissued as GL 47B on August 27, 2026.
Authorizes providing goods, technology, software, or services for oil, gas, or petrochemical exploration/development/production. It also covers electricity generation/transmission but expressly prohibits forming new joint ventures in Venezuela. Most recently reissued as GL 48C on August 27, 2026. GL 48D bars forming new joint ventures, but GL 49B contemplates negotiating contingent contracts that include forming new JVs, with performance needing a specific license.
Covers port and airport operations/use involving the Government of Venezuela.
Authorizes negotiating and entering into contingent contracts for new oil, gas, petrochemical, or electricity investment, but performance of those contracts still requires a separate, specific OFAC license.
Identifies specific companies authorized to conduct operations: Chevron, BP, Eni, Repsol, Shell, and Maurel & Prom. This is a "closed list" model so being a major energy company doesn't help unless they are named or acting as a subcontractor or service provider to a named entity. Most recently reissued as GL 50C on August 27, 2026, with the underlying company list unchanged. It requires reports on all transactions, not just non-US ones.
Goods and services for generation, transmission, storage, distribution, primarily benefiting the Venezuelan state utility CORPOELEC.
Export of Venezuelan-origin gold to the US for purchase, transport, sale, refining and resale by established US entities. Most recently reissued as GL 51C on August 27, 2026. GL 51D covers coal and minerals, including gold, and names Carbozulia and Minerven. It bars in-kind payments, and it bars mining, extraction, processing and JV formation in Venezuela. It requires reports every 30 days, including chain-of-custody documentation, to the US State and Interior Departments.
Codifies broader mining-sector licenses covering goods, technology, software and services for exploration, mining, extraction, processing and refining and purchase/transport/sale of Venezuelan minerals and provision of mining-related goods/services. Most recently reissued as GL 54B on August 27, 2026. GL 55A is the contingent-contract license for new investment in coal and minerals. Performance of those contracts must be made contingent on separate OFAC authorization. GL 54C bars forming new joint ventures, but GL 49B contemplates negotiating contingent contracts that include forming new JVs, with performance needing a specific license.
Authorizes transactions with PDVSA and PDVSA-majority-owned entities by established US entities, covering the lifting, exportation, sale, storage, marketing, purchase, delivery, and transportation of Venezuelan-origin oil and petroleum products. GL 52C, issued on September 14, 2026 and replacing GL 52B, both eases and tightens the license in the same instrument: it newly permits blocked PDVSA officials to sign and execute contracts, but strictly limited to their official PDVSA capacity and solely to effectuate transactions the license already authorizes, while adding a new restriction that bars any transaction affecting the governance of PDV Holding, Inc., Citgo Holding, Inc., or CITGO Petroleum. GL 52C authorizes all transactions otherwise prohibited by EO 13884 or 13850 involving PDVSA and its 50%-owned entities, by established U.S. entities. It then carves out bonds and debt, settlements and enforcement, other SDNs, and now CITGO governance. It also broadens the permitted dispute-resolution fora beyond the United States alone to the United States, United Kingdom, France, or Singapore, continues to prohibit commercially unreasonable terms and payment via gold, debt swaps, or certain Venezuelan-government-linked digital assets, and continues to exclude counterparties connected to Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and, under specified conditions, China. GL 5Z moved the effective date for transactions on the PDVSA 2020 bond to November 5, 2026, and until then the sale of the pledged CITGO Holding shares requires a specific license. Like GL 46E, GL 52C requires reporting only for non-US exports.
Covers official missions of the Government of Venezuela to the United States.
Allows commercial-related negotiation of contingent contracts with the Government of Venezuela. Entry into and performance of any contract must be expressly contingent on OFAC authorization. It excludes bond and debt transactions, settlements and enforcement, and any SDN or entity 50%-owned by SDNs. It excludes Russian, Iranian, North Korean and Cuban parties. For China, it excludes only Venezuelan or US entities owned or controlled by a PRC-located person.
Authorizes financial services for Banco Central de Venezuela, Banco de Venezuela, Banco Digital de los Trabajadores, Banco del Tesoro and certain Government of Venezuela individuals, including USD correspondent services. The same license says BSA, PATRIOT Act and FinCEN obligations still apply, and it gives US banks a safe harbor for relying on the originator.
Authorizes legal, financial advisory and consulting services to the Government of Venezuela and PDVSA in connection with potential debt restructuring. It does not authorize the restructuring itself or direct negotiations with creditors. It requires a copy of the signed services contract to the Departments of State and Energy within 10 business days. GLs 56 and GL 58 quote section 6(d) of the Executive Order 13884. In the order, the Government of Venezuela includes any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality, any person owned or controlled by them, and any person who has acted or purported to act on their behalf. Therefore, the 50 percent rule is not the whole analysis for Government of Venezuela entities. The rule applies to PDVSA, Minerven and state-owned airline Conviasa, which the GLs name separately.
Authorizes supplying goods, technology, software and services for maintenance, repair and airworthiness of aircraft in which state-owned airline Conviasa has an interest. It excludes military or intelligence activity and has the same ownership-based China clause as GL 56.
Authorizes the supply from the US, or by a US person, of goods, technology, software, or services for the installation, maintenance, refurbishment, repair, upgrade, operation, or support of telecommunications in Venezuela, including transactions involving the Government of Venezuela, CONATEL (Venezuela's state telecommunications regulator), and CANTV (the state telephone/internet provider). Issued August 21, 2026; reissued as GL 61A on August 27, 2026. GL 61A requires the reports to be sent to the US Department of State and bars forming new joint ventures, but GL 49B contemplates negotiating contingent contracts that include forming new JVs, with performance needing a specific license. GL 61A bars payment terms that are not commercially reasonable, involve debt swaps or payments in gold, or are denominated in digital currency, digital coin, or digital tokens issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, including the petro. It also bars any transaction involving a person located in or organized under the laws of Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, China or any entity that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by or in a joint venture with such countries.
Authorizes negotiating and entering into contingent contracts for new telecom investment, and performance must be made contingent on separate OFAC authorization. It covers forming new JVs at the contingent-contract stage. It excludes any person located in China, Russia, Iran, North Korea or Cuba, and any entity owned or controlled by or in a JV with them. It also points to FCC, Team Telecom and BIS requirements.
Issued June 25, 2026 to authorize transactions related to earthquake relief efforts in Venezuela, including transactions involving the Government of Venezuela and SDNs, and clarifying that US financial institutions may process related third-country payments. GL 60 supplements the pre-existing GL 29 (humanitarian NGO transactions) and, absent further extension, expires on October 23, 2026.
GLs 61/61A and 62 are the first OFAC authorizations to meaningfully open the telecommunications sector, extending the same general architecture (broad license for support/services; narrower contingent-contract license for new investment pending specific authorization) already used in the energy sector.
The short list
In sum, the 12 key compliance concerns for anyone operating in Venezuela or partnering with individuals or entities in Venezuela could be boiled down to:
“Established US entity” vs. “US person”: GLs 46D and 51C use a narrower standard (US-organized entity formed on or before January 29, 2025) than the broader “US person” standard used elsewhere. Newly formed US entities, or foreign companies routing through a shell US entity, don't qualify — this appears deliberately designed to prevent “gaming” the license.
Foreign-adversary exclusions are strict and vary by license. Some licenses exclude any person located in or organized under the laws of China: 48D, 49B, 50C, 54C, 55A and 61A. Others, 46E, 51D and 52C, exclude only Venezuelan or US entities owned, controlled or in a joint venture with Chinese-located persons. Screening obligations here are non-trivial. Ownership chains need real diligence, not just a jurisdiction check.
Mandatory dispute resolution is no longer uniformly US-only. Contracts with the Government of Venezuela or PDVSA entities under several GLs must still be governed by US law, but GL 52C now permits dispute resolution in the US, United Kingdom, France, or Singapore rather than in the US alone. Because this varies by license and by version — and because OFAC has repeatedly narrowed or broadened this requirement across successive reissues — counterparties must confirm the governing-law and forum requirements of the specific, current GL applicable to their transaction rather than assuming the terms of an earlier version still apply. This is a real, evolving drafting requirement, not boilerplate.
Payments are controlled by the US government, not free-flowing. Any payments to blocked persons (beyond local taxes, permits and/or fees) must go into designated Foreign Government Deposit Funds or OFAC-identified accounts. Funds effectively stay under US government control ”on behalf of” the Venezuelan government rather than flowing directly. GL 52C additionally bars payment via gold, debt swaps, or certain Venezuelan-government-linked digital assets. This has real cash-flow and banking implications.
Reporting obligations are active, not passive. Several GLs require periodic reports to OFAC (and, for certain non-US oil/petrochemical transfers under GL 52-series licenses, to the State and Energy Departments within 10 days of the first transaction and every 90 days thereafter) on counterparties, quantities, values, dates, and (in some cases) taxes and fees paid to the Venezuelan government. The US government has ongoing visibility into these deals.
Specific licenses still matter. A GL doesn't cover everything. If a planned activity doesn't fit squarely within an existing GL, - including new investment under GL 49 or GL 62, which require a further specific license before contract performance - a case-by-case specific license will be required, and OFAC has signaled the GL conditions (adversary exclusions, US dispute resolution, controlled payment mechanisms) inform how favorably it views specific license applications.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (“FTO”) and terrorism designations operate independently of the Venezuela sanctions program. Tren de Aragua and Cartel de los Soles are both designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations/Specially Designated Global Terrorists, with documented ties to the Venezuelan government and mining sector. None of the Venezuela-specific GLs - including the new telecommunications and PDVSA licenses - override FTO-related prohibitions. This is a distinct and serious compliance layer, especially for mining and gold-sector activity and businesses requiring complex supply chain operations.
The individual sanctions landscape is still shifting. Interim President Rodríguez was removed from the SDN list in April 2026, and other individuals tied to the former government may still be designated even as institutional and commercial relations warm further following the oil agreement. Her brother, Jorge Jesús Rodríguez Gómez was delisted on October 14, 2026. GL 52C's new allowance for blocked PDVSA officials to sign contracts in their official capacity is itself a narrow, conditional carve-out, not a delisting. The individuals involved may remain SDNs for all other purposes. The status of a potential partner can change month to month.
Political and legal legitimacy questions remain live. The manner of Maduro's capture has been questioned by legal scholars under international law, and the durability of the Rodríguez interim government is not guaranteed. The 100-year concession granted to NABEP, and the divergent US and Venezuelan characterizations of the oil agreement's terms and duration, add a further layer of political and legal risk: US government officials and outside advisers have already flagged that a future US or Venezuelan administration could seek to revisit the arrangement. This creates genuine counterparty and political risk independent of the sanctions' technicalities.
Corruption/AML legacy risk is severe. Given the scale of documented graft under Chávez and Maduro enhanced due diligence on any Venezuelan counterparty's ownership, beneficial ownership chains, and fund sourcing is essential. This includes for counterparties newly active in the oil, telecommunications, and mining sectors as licensing expands.
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) still apply independently. Equipment, technology, and services tied to oil and mining activity may separately implicate Commerce Department export controls, on top of OFAC sanctions clearance.
The NABEP/oil agreement structure is a new, still-developing diligence category. Because NABEP sits outside the GL 50 closed-list model and its authority derives from a combination of Venezuela's domestic hydrocarbons law and a bespoke US government arrangement rather than a single named-entity general license, counterparties, subcontractors, and financing sources should independently verify which license (general or specific) actually covers their intended activity, track how OFAC's Venezuela GLs are amended to reflect the agreement, and watch for related-party issues potentially affecting NABEP’s ownership.
Companies with long and successful histories operating in Venezuela that ceased operations due to the daunting challenges starting in the early 2000s are still reluctant to resume commercial activities, even knowing the upside that first or second movers may enjoy in the current environment. The August 2026 oil agreement and the accompanying wave of general licenses culminating, for now, in GL 52C, make that upside larger, but they have not simplified the underlying compliance picture. If anything, the pace and specificity of change have increased. A robust compliance program should address and be built for continuous monitoring and transaction-by-transaction assessment, rather than as a one-time policy. Expert guidance with intimate knowledge of the ever-shifting variants that affect the applicable framework in Venezuela is crucial to avoid costly misunderstandings and ensure efficient and effective deployment of resources.
Next in the series
In our next analysis of the Venezuela Risk Landscape, we will go over the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other relevant and applicable Anti-Corruption legislation. Even though the FCPA has taken a secondary role in the current US administration, it is still a law, and the compliance of its mandate is still very much a guiding principle.